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ANTITRUST REACTION TO THE MERGER
WAVE: THE REVOLUTION VS. THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION
ARTHUR AusTiNt
In the past antitrust laws have been used to regulate corporate
mergers. In this Article Professor Austin discusses the major merger pe-
riods and subsequent antitrust reactions. He focuses on the clash be-
tween antimerger precedent which utilized antitrust law to regulate
merger activity and the promerger "revolution" which fails to use anti-
trust to inhibit the current "merger mania. " Austin observes the influ-
ence of the Chicago School of Economics on this promerger movement
The Article concludes with a discussion of whether an antimeiger "coun-
terrevolution" could succeed.
INTRODUCTION
The current corporate merger wave-commonly called "merger mania" 1
is setting new records2 in exceeding the 1897-1905 "Turn of the Century" move-
ment.3 Even the Black Monday stock crash of October 1987 has not deterred
the frequency of "M & As."'4 Like its predecessors, the new wave is sparking
controversy. 5
Since enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the antitrust laws have been
used to regulate merger activity. 6 Amendments, decisions, and regulatory poli-
cies under the Act provide the government with wide discretionary power to
intervene and prohibit mergers. Prior to 1970 the government exploited this
discretion to implement a sweeping antimerger campaign. Under the guidance
of Chief Justice Warren, the United States Supreme Court created a phalanx of
antimerger precedent. This precedent is now threatened by a revolution in anti-
trust.7 The efficiency school of economics, presuming procompetitive conse-
t Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University. B.S. 1958, University of Vir-
ginia; LL.B. 1963, Tulane University.
1. The word "mania" has been popularized by the trade media. See, e.g., Deal Mania: The
Tempo Is Frantic, And The Future Prosperity Of The U.S. Is At Stake, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at
74 [hereinafter Deal Mania].
2. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
4. Lee, Takeover Pace Is Seen Picking Up In 1988, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1988, at B8, col. 4;
Takeover Fever Is Rising Again, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 28, 1987, at 82; see infra notes 130-32 and accom-
panying text.
5. See infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
6. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1982)). The
primary target of the Sherman Act was the "trust" form of consolidation. "The trust was popularly
regarded as nothing but a new form of monopoly, and the whole force of the [Antitrust] tradition
was focused against it immediately." W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 59
(1965).
7. Revolution in this context is "a political idea, not just a political act." Brown, You Say
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quences of mergers, espouses nonintervention by government. The Reagan
Administration adopted efficiency economics in enforcement of the antitrust
laws, and as a consequence, antitrust has not been used to inhibit merger mania.
Confirming Professor Galbraith's principle of countervailing power,8 a
counterrevolution is emerging. The advocates of the counterrevolution argue
that antimerger enforcement should be instituted to control the new wave. The
outcome of the revolution versus counterrevolution confrontation will determine
the future of antitrust and section 7 of the Clayton Act (Clayton 7)9, the an-
timerger statute.
The current antitrust controversy is complicated by the growing presence of
state antitakeover laws whose purpose is to protect home firms from hostile raid-
ers.10 Moreover, attitudes on Clayton 7 enforcement may be influenced by judg-
ments of whether mergers improve management efficiency and whether the
interest of shareholders is protected during takeover battles.
This Article assays the major merger periods and describes the form and
method of the subsequent antitrust reaction. It discusses the possibility of reviv-
ing Warren Court precedent to stop the present wave, as well as the two obsta-
cles that stand in the way of such a revival-the administration's promerger
policy and the influence of the Chicago School's efficiency economics. The Arti-
cle concludes by focusing on the main issue: can a liberal-populist antimerger
counterrevolution succeed?
I. THE LEGACY OF J.D., J.P. & THE JUDGE
A. The First Wave
"The Turn Of The Century Movement"'" of mergers and acquisitions es-
tablished the frame of reference for identifying a wave. From 1897 to 1905,
John D. Rockefeller, Judge Gary, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan outdueled
rivals to aggrandize large segments of the economy. Their creations endure. 12
For example, USX (formerly U.S. Steel), originally a consolidation of II holding
Begin, I Say Commence - To The Victor Belongs The Language (Book Review), N.Y. Times, Dec.
20, 1987, at 13, col. 1.
8. See J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1956).
9. Clayton Act, ch. 3, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
10. See Romano, The Political Economy Of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987); see
infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
11. J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 257
(1972).
12. One Commentator stated:
The importance of the initial era of merger activity in shaping our present day industrial
structures can hardly be exaggerated. Not only did the consolidations put together during
a short span of about 10 years transform competitive industries into oligopolistic struc-
tures, they determined the form of the oligopoly itself. Typically this form was asymmetri-
cal, with one (and in some cases 2) oligopolists dominant and others of distinctively
secondary importance.... [TMhe asymmetrical oligopolist created during the "great con-
solidation movement" have endured for nearly three-quarters of a century.
[Vol. 66
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companies and 785 operating plants, 13 lingers on as a weather-beaten memorial
to the golden age of holding companies. During this period, some 301 firms were
absorbed annually. The peak year was 1899 when 1028 firms were acquired.
14
Most mergers were horizontal, aimed at achieving dominance in a particular
product market.15 The fashionable buzzwords were "robber baron," "survival
of the fittest," and "morganizing" (the process of consolidating competing
firms). 16 Sermonizing on these themes, John D. Rockefeller advised a Sunday
school class:
The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest ....
The American Beauty Rose can be produced in the splendor and fra-
grance which bring cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early
buds which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in busi-
ness. It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of
God. 17
This lecture was not the type to give a young nation with a strong Jefferso-
nian distrust of concentrations of power, whether political or economic. Public
discontent with the Rockefeler-Carnegie philosophy of social Darwinism in the
marketplace was exacerbated by the perceived inability of the Sherman Act to
contain the agglomerating barons. 18
13. C. CRAMER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: FREE AND NOT So FREE 422 (1972).
14. J. BLAIR, supra note 11, at 258.
15. "The merger-consolidations in this period were comprehensive and included a large
number of firms in an industry, with the purpose of establishing a dominant firm. It was these early
consolidations that led to the linking of mergers in the economic literature to monopoly and oligop-
oly." S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY 39 (1968).
16. J. BLAIR, supra note 11, at 262. Morgan was clearly the leader. "Had it not been for the
ability, energy, and drive for power of John Pierpont Morgan, the initial merger wave would never
have reached the heights it did." Id. Morgan's objectives were efficiency and profit. "It struck him
as wasteful for dozens of small, relatively inefficient companies to cut one another's throats to get
business. Why not merge them into a few giant corporations that would avoid price wars and pro-
duce efficiently?" Merwin, J.P. Morgan: The Agglomerator, FORBES, July 13, 1987, at 275.
17. R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 45 (1962). Rockefeller
also is quoted as saying: "God gave me money." Osinski, The Rise Of The Beady-eyed Billionaire,
Akron Beacon J., Aug. 26, 1984, at 1, 6. Carnegie adhered to the "law of competition." "[W]hile
the law may sometimes be hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it insures the
survival of the fittest in every department." R. HOFSTADTER, supra, at 47.
Some historians argue that Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Morgan have gotten a "bad rap." "How
did Carnegie and Rockefeller do so well? They cut costs, innovated, vertically integrated, and gave
bonuses on the basis of merit. Competitors who did not do these things fell by the wayside, but
consumers and job-seekers benefited from low prices and American dominance." Folson, Entrepre-
neurs vi The Textbooks, Wall St. J., July 22, 1987, at 18.
18. One commentator described the period:
During the administrations of Cleveland and McKinley, the laws had scarcely been en-
forced. Powerful new combinations had been formed in steel, tin cans, corn products, farm
machinery, and many other industries. During the administrations of Roosevelt and Taft,
monopolistic abuses had been disclosed in hearings before committees of Congress, in the
reports of public agencies, and in the evidence presented in cases brought before the courts.
Though it was shown that competition had been eliminated by particular business prac-
tices, these practices had not been held to be in violation of the law.
C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 55 (3d ed. 1955).
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B. The Reaction
Although the "Turn of the Century Movement" ultimately was terminated
by the effects of the 1903 depression, 19 the deep anxiety over the "evils" of con-
solidation continued to ferment as a political issue. The debate was resolved by
the enactment of the Clayton antimerger act in 1914.20 As the first reformation
of antitrust, Clayton 7 was more than a political accommodation to populism
and other political pressures. The genius of Clayton 7 was that it initiated a
policy for responding to the industrialization of a young economy. Congress
sought "to create a legal framework in which private enterprise could operate
with market conditions not necessarily perfectly competitive, but more competi-
tive than the conditions that had come to be described as a monopoly in a partic-
ular market. ' 21 As policy, Clayton 7 expressly identified merger and market
concentration as public issues. Moreover, Congress formalized legal and admin-
istrative forums for dialogue by allocating enforcement to the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.).22
II. THE "INVISIBLE WAVE" AND THE "THREAT" OF CONCENTRATION
A. The Amendment
Gaps in coverage rendered Clayton 7 ineffective. The drafters were so riv-
eted to trust formations via stock manipulation that they omitted coverage of
asset acquisitions.23 Because most of the "first wave" consolidations involved
direct competitors, the courts assumed the Clayton Act applied exclusively to
horizontal mergers. 24 These gaps neutralized enforcement; between 1927 and
1950, only thirty-one complaints were filed by the F.T.C.25
The ineffectiveness of the Clayton Act contributed to a second merger wave
that lasted from 1926 until staggered by the 1930 depression. Although involv-
ing a large number of acquisitions, the impact of this movement "was neither so
pronounced nor so widely dispersed as that of the earliest period."' 26 Very few
19. S. REID, supra note 15, at 50.
20. Clayton Act ch. 3, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)). In addition, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission with authority to prohibit
"unfair methods of competition .. " See generally D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON
ACT 20-56 (1959) (discussing the legislative history of the Clayton Act); Oppenheim, Guide To
Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act With The Sherman Act and Clayton
Acts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 821 (1961) (addressing separate but interrelated antitrust problems).
21. D. MARTIN, supra note 20, at 43-44.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1982).
23. "The reasons for this distinction were the particular aversion that had grown up to holding
companies, and the old and somewhat superstitious desire to abolish secretive monopolizing, which
many considered more reprehensible than open monopolizing." W. LETWIN, supra note 6, at 275.
24. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 313 (1962).
25. D. MARTIN, supra note 20, at 150. During this period, the Justice Department played a
minor role in Clayton 7 enforcement. Id. at 205. 1926 was the year of the first Supreme Court
interpretation of Clayton 7. See F.T.C. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
26. Bok, Section 7 of The Clayton Act And The Merging Of Law And Economics, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 226, 230 (1960). "A second merger movement in the 1920's affected a number of new and
emerging industries and solidified the oligopolistic organization of the older basic industries."
F T C Economic Report On Corporate Mergers, Part 8A, at 30 (1969).
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mergers were horizontal, thus escaping the reach of Clayton 7.27
In a vigorous post-World War II economy, politicians, with the encourage-
ment of economists, focused sufficient attention on the statutory gaps to create a
national issue. F.T.C. economists provided rationalization for legislative reform
with a 1948 study warning that "if nothing is done to check the growth in con-
centration, either the giant corporations will ultimately take over the country, or
the Government will be impelled to step in and impose some form of direct
regulation in the public interest."'2 8 In reality, there was no-threat: "The sup-
posed 'sharp rise in economic concentration' through mergers which concerned
the Congress was long ago shown to be a piece of fiction." 29 Nevertheless, after
widely publicized hearings, Congress plugged the gaps with the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment of 1950.30
The statutory and political foundation for an antimerger agenda was now
on the books. A nonexistent merger threat concocted by F.T.C. economists had
sensitized the political system to the popular appeal of antimerger rhetoric. In
the 1960s the "sleeper" antimerger agenda was fulfilled with a vengeance.
B. The Supreme Court Lays the Minefield
Slightly over a decade after the amendment, the United States Supreme
Court rendered a series of decisions whose only apparent logic was that, as Mr.
Justice Stewart caustically complained, the government always won.3 1 The ma-
jority opinions of this period are a metamorphosis of economics, populism, and
opaque value judgments. Chief Justice Warren orchestrated the new ideology in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 32 by announcing that in amending Clayton 7,
Congress sought "to promote competition through the protection of viable,
small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization. '33
A majority of the Court followed the Chief Justice's antimerger obsession
by helping to forge an impenetrable minefield of precedent. Brown Shoe's func-
27. F T C. Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, supra note 26, at 37.
28. F.T.C., Report On The Merger Movement A Summary Report, V, at 68 (1948).
29. Adelman, Economic Aspects Of The Bethlehem Opinion, 45 VA. L. REV. 684, 685-86 (1959).
According to Bok, "subsequent research and analysis have largely confirmed the conclusion that the
postwar merger movement had rather harmless effects." Bok, supra note 26, at 232. Debate over
the existence and effects of market concentration is inconclusive. The classic study on concentration
is G. NUTrER & H. EINHoRN, ENTERPRIsE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATEs: 1899-1958
(1969).
30. Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
31. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
33. Id. at 344. The Bork and Bowman reaction: "No matter how many times you read it, that
passage states: Although mergers are not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent
stores may be adversely affected, we must recognize that mergers are unlawful when small independ-
ent stores may be adversely affected." Bork & Bowman, The Crisis In Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
363, 373 (1965).
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tional test was a vacuum cleaner. Under the Court's interpretation of the 1950
amendment, it is doubtful that any merger could slip through the comprehensive
enforcement net that proscribes merger activity when: (1) there is a probability
or a "tendency" toward oligopoly; (2) other mergers will be "triggered";
(3) mom and pop enterprises may be eliminated; or (4) the acquisition creates
efficiencies. 34
A subsequent decision, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 35 com-
plemented Brown Shoe by introducing a static version of market structuralism as
a test for liability: "a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market" is presumptively illegal. 36 Similarly, in-
terindustry mergers were thwarted by United States v. Continental Can Co., 37 in
which the Court maneuvered glass and metal containers into a single product
market to satisfy the mathematics of the Philadelphia National Bank equation. 38
The possibility that a safe harbor might exist for "small" mergers was torpedoed
by the court in United States v. Von's Grocery.39 In Von's Grocery Justice Black
relied on "mom and pop" protectionism and the assumption of a "trend" to-
ward oligopoly to strike down a merger between two Los Angeles grocery chains
that would have resulted in combined sales of 7.5 percent in a highly competitive
market. 4o
It was a remarkable crusade. Within two years the Warren Court supplied
the Justice Department with a series of decisions that gave it the leverage to stop
any and all horizontal mergers. Actual effects on competition were irrelevant.4 1
These court opinions relied on three broad assumptions: (1) aggregate concen-
tration was a serious threat to the economy, (2) mergers constituted the main
cause of concentration, and (3) mergers were, for various sociopolitical reasons,
inherently "bad." Antimergerism was as American as apple pie.
34. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 311-23.
35. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
36. Id. at 363.
37. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
38. The decision was criticized for fostering unpredictability, '.'since it can never be clear pre-
cisely how far a court will go in any particular case in shaping a result-oriented market definition."
Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory To Legal
Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 307-08 (1967).
39. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
40. "[T]he basic purpose of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentra-
tion in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business." Id. at
275.
41. In criticizing the Antitrust Division's disdain for case by case evaluation of relevant eco-
nomic facts, Milton Handler said:
Is the Court warranted in transforming an antimerger law designed to protect compe-
tition into an anti-concentration measure without regard to competitive effects? I think
not, both as a matter of the proper relationship between the legislative and judicial
branches of government and as a matter of legal and economic policy.
M. HANDLER, TwErY-FivE YEARs oF AN-rrrusr 111 (1973).
[Vol. 66
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III. THE CONGLOMERATE WAVE
A. The Young Barons
As the 1890's were the heyday of the trusts, so this decade is rapidly
emerging as the golden age of the conglomerates. 42
The holding company concept of the robber baron period was finessed into
"diversification" in the 1920s and 1930s and eventually exploded as "conglomer-
ation" in the mid-1960s.43 By conglomerating-connecting firms who were not
in direct product or geographical competition-the executive suite outflanked
the Warren Court's Maginot Line defense against horizontal mergers." Tittilat-
ing the public with expressions like "synergy, ' '4 5 "2+2=5," and "Chinese
money,"' 46 the conglomerate epidemic blitzed the marketplace. It was an era of
slogans like "Welcome To Our Conglomerate. You're Fired!"4 7 The conglom-
erate barons were young, brash, and aggressive newcomers whose lightning
quick tactics offended the old boy executive suite establishment. "They have
fought their way up from obscurity by innovating and taking risks in a way that
flabbergasts conventional executives .... They are willing to dare much to gain
a larger hold on the future."'48
In disrupting the status quo, the mavericks became so unpopular and
threatening that the Nixon Administration's Antitrust Division interceded. 49
According to Fortune, "The events that triggered Washington into action are
not hard to discern. It was not the number of mergers or the concentration
ratios, but rather the threat to the established way of doing corporate
business."50
42. Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration And Section Seven: The Limitations Of The Anti-
Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1231, 1231 (1968).
43. F.T.C. statistics indicate that during the years 1960-1966, 71% of all mergers involving
large manufacturing and mining firms were conglomerate. ABA Antitrust Developments 1955-1968,
at 83 n.57 (1968); see F.T.C. EcONOMIc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS, supra note 26, at 62.
44. One commentator stated:
The rules developed for determining the validity of horizontal and vertical mergers clearly
will not do for conglomerate acquisitions generally. In the familiar types of horizontal and
vertical merger cases, the Supreme Court has come to place important... weight on the
share of the relevant markets controlled by the acquiring and acquired companies .... But
whatever significance can be attached to market shares in these cases, quite clearly the
significance becomes less when we deal with conglomerate mergers, and indeed may com-
pletely vanish.
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers And Section 7 Of The Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1315-16
(1965); see J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION 4 (1968).
45. Synergy denotes "the fact that the firm seeks a product-market posture with a combined
performance that is greater than the sum of its parts." H. AusoFF, CORPORATE STRATEGY 75
(1965).
46. "Chinese money" was debentures and stock warrants. The Conglomerates' War to Reshape
Industry, TIME, March 7, 1969, at 79 [hereinafter The Conglomerates' War].
47. I. BARMASH, WELCOME To OUR CONGLOMERATE-YOU'RE FIRED! (1971).
48. The Conglomerates' War, supra note 46, at 76.
49. S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL PoPULISTS 218 (1974). "Indeed, many observers believed it to
be more than coincidental that the Nixon administration discovered the conglomerate issue only
after established corporate managements... found themselves facing takeover threats from the new
conglomerateurs." Id.
50. Caveron, It's Open Season on Conglomerates and Established Business Couldn't Be Happier,
FORTUNE, May 1, 1969, at 43, 44.
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B. The Anticonglomerate Campaign
The Antitrust Division brilliantly co-opted Clayton 7 flexibility (expressed
in terms such as "may be," "probability," and "incipiency") 51 to stretch an-
timerger proscription to the frontier of eccentricity. Converting a priori eco-
nomic theory into legal precedent, the Justice Department set out to convince
the courts that conglomeration was a curse on the economy. The first step was
to conjure up "oligopoly" as the theoretical bogeyman.
Ubiquitous and virtually impossible to define, oligopoly became the point
guard for the attack.5 2 According to government theory, when oligopolistic
conditions existed, "actual competition ceases to be a vital force; by mutual con-
sent, it is abandoned in favor of parallel behavior and the 'easy life.' ,,s3 The
Antitrust Division briefs argued that Clayton 7 liability should descend on "evi-
dence of oligopolistic tendencies."'54 Nonstructural factors such as innovation,
management genius, and efficiencies were ignored.
The linchpins of the Department of Justice's game plan were "condition of
entry," "potential competition," and the assumption that every firm in the uni-
verse is a potential competitor to other firms in some unidentified market.55 Ex-
isting firms fear that potential competitors might enter the market de novo to
become a new threat, and thus-theoretically-they operate more competitively
than otherwise in order to discourage entry.56 Moreover, rather than extract a
The combination of threatened or successful attacks on old line management in the steel
industry, the oil industry, the insurance industry, and the banking industry culminated in
far-reaching demands from industry itself for investigation and elimination of the disrup-
tive conditions.
This public attention, notoriety and industry demand sparked unprecedented atten-
tion at the national level to the problems of corporate mergers. In the first six months of
1969 at least 8 major investigations were underway at the national level into federal ques-
tions concerning mergers and acquisitions by conglomerate corporations.
JUDICIARY COMM., ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., INVESTIGATION OF CONGLOMERATE CORPORATIONS,
H. R. Doe., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
51. "Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition,' to indicate that its
concern was with probabilities, not certainties." Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 323 (1962).
52. The Government argued:
It is no answer to say that a merger need not be forbidden unless it actually creates oligop-
oly. For there is no magic point at which oligopoly springs full bloom into existence.
Between the highly fragmented and the tightly concentrated market structure there is a
middle area, one broad part of which is certainly a danger zone. No one can say-at least
not without an inquiry far broader and deeper than practical law enforcement permits--at
precisely what point a particular market will exhibit oligopolistic behavior. It is thus
meaningless to speak of allowing firms to merge up to the lower limit of oligopoly; practi-
cally speaking, that limit is unascertainable.
Brief For the United States at 27-28, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (No.
65-30).
53. Brief For F.T.C at 31, F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (No. 66-342).
54. Brief For the United States, at 25, Von's Grocery Co.
55. See generally J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION] (description and analysis of market structure, conduct, and performance of Ameri-
can economy with identification of those structures conducive to workable competition and implica-
tion for regulatory policy); J. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION (1956) [hereinafter
BARRIERS] ("analyzes the character and significance of the 'condition of entry' to manufacturing
industries").
56. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 233
(1970).
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super-competitive price as the usual entitlement of an oligopolist, firms adopt a
lower "limit" price that is set to discourage new entry. 57 This created a Catch-
22 scenario: whenever a firm entered a market by acquisition of an existing firm,
it eliminated its positive influence as a perceived potential competitor and thus-
theoretically-lessened competition.
Potential competition theory became case law in Federal Trade Commission
v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 58 Proctor & Gamble was ordered to divest Clorox
when the Court detected a wickerwork of a priori threats: the merger eliminated
Proctor as a "perceived" potential competitive threat to Clorox and its rivals.
Proctor would have used its deep pockets to subsidize Clorox in activities such
as advertising, and the Proctor-Clorox presence would inhibit the competitive
aggressiveness of smaller rivals. 59
On a roll, the government antitrust witchdoctors concocted the "but for"
theory; even if the present acquisition "probably" would not lessen competition
at the time of consummation, "but for" the acquisition, the acquiring firm could
have entered the market de novo sometime in the future to produce a procompe-
titive effect. 6° This theory was too much for Dean Rahl, who said, "The compe-
tition lessened is competition which did not exist, but which was 'potential' in
the sense that it is competition which the firm in question might have created
itself."61
With Kafkaesque sleight of hand, the government continued to stretch
Clayton 7's "may be substantially to lessen competition" proscriptive standard.
"Reciprocity effect" was invoked as another counter to conglomeration. 62 For
example, if a diversified food processor who buys products from meat suppliers
acquires a firm that sells products used by the meat suppliers, a reciprocity con-
figuration is created, and it is "probable" that to gain favor, meat suppliers will
buy products from the acquired firm. The mere existence of the new relation-
ship and the potential for reciprocal buying constitutes a "probability" of a les-
57. BARRIERS, supra note 55, at 4-13. For a critical view of Bain's assumptions see Markovits,
Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, And the Legality Of Horizontal And Conglomerate Merg-
ers Under The American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 658 (discussing the "limit price
theory").
58. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
59. Id. at 578-79.
60. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 560-62 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
61. Rahl, Applicability Of The Clayton Act To Potential Competition, 12 ABA ANTrrauST L.J.
128, 142-43 (1958); see Note, Toehold Acquisitions And The Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 156 (1972).
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the Court may have set such
stringent requirements so as to render reliance on the "but for" premise tenuous. There must be
proof that the defendant had a "feasible means" for entering the market other than by acquisition
and "that those means offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration.., or
other significant procompetitive effects." Id. at 633.
62. Reciprocity effect is "an alleged tendency for prospective suppliers of a firm to direct their
purchases to that firm in order to maintain its goodwill. The larger the firm, presumably, the greater
its leverage in the market-place and the greater the danger to competition from this 'reciprocity
effect."' United States v. White Consol. Indus., [Jan.-June] Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
504, at D-1 (March 16, 1971); see Allis Chambers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506,
518-19 (3rd Cir. 1969), cerL denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
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sening of competition. 63
Like Captain Kirk and the U.S.S. Enterprise, the Antitrust Division trav-
eled the domestic universe shooting down mergers with the "potential competi-
tion" phaser.64 By the early 1970s the conglomerate wave had receded to a
trickle. In addition to the government's attack, economic factors such as a re-
cession and problems among Wall Street brokerage firms, in addition to the ac-
tions of OPEC and the effects of the oil crisis, contributed to the demise of the
wave. For some conglomerates it was a time to pause and reorient their new
empires. What remained intact, however, was a minefield of antimerger
precedent.
IV. THE "NEW" CLASSIC MERGER WAVE
Dust off the record books. Fortune's tally of the 50 biggest U.S. deals
completed in 1986 includes new highs in virtually every category. 65
A. The Revival of Adam Smith Capitalism
The present merger explosion surpasses the previous waves in the amounts
of money involved and the size of firms. "Over the past four years the U.S. has
witnessed the greatest reshuffling of corporate assets in its history." 66 Flamboy-
ant personalities dominate the headlines as the media provides tittilating de-
scriptions of takeover warfare. T. Boone Pickens, Jr., the self-styled populist
raider, claims to be the "champion of the small stockholder," 67 while the candid
Sir James Goldsmith says, "I do it [raid] to make money."6 8
Why the merger wave? The Republican presidential victory in 1980 pro-
duced a unique political and economic climate that favored mergers. The Rea-
gan Administration has been conservative both in rhetoric and in deed. In
contrast to the Nixon Administration's ambivalence towards capitalism, as re-
flected in its vigorous but sometimes contradictory tirade against conglomera-
tion, 69 the Reagan White House openly embraces John D. Rockefeller's
63. F.T.C. v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594-95, 600-01 (1965). For a criticism of
reciprocity doctrine, see J. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLIcY 40-42,
61-63 (1973); Note, Conglomerate Mergers And The Theory Of Reciprocity, 22 STAN. L. REv. 812
(1970).
64. Lee Loevinger, a former head of the Antitrust Division, said, "Potentiality theory is a kind
of legal ESP--extra sensory proof. It substitutes the ectoplasm of hypothesis for the protoplasm of
fact, relies on potentiality instead of reality, and offers faith instead of proof." How To Succeed In
Business Without Being Tried [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 496, at D-1, 12
(Jan. 19, 1971) (speech by Lee Loevinger to Association For Corporate Growth).
65. Wiener, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1987, at 68, 68.
66. For Better Or For Worse?, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1987, at 38, 38; see Deal Mania, supra note
1, at 74. As with all economic behavior, the extent of the wave is disputed. "Evidently we are near
the crest of a merger wave., but there were three others in this century. The current wave is one of
the smaller ones." Fuhrman, Here We Go Again, FORBES, July 13, 1987, at 242, 242.
67. The Raiders, Bus. WEEK, March 4, 1985, at 80.
68. Id. at 81. (" 'I'm not a do-gooder.' says Goldsmith.") The Two Worlds Of Jimmy Gold-
smith, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 1, 1986, at 98, 98.
69. Ironically, it was a campaign that did not meet with Nixon's approval, who stated: "[The
Antitrust Division has] gone off on a kick, that'll make them big goddamn trust busters. That was
all right fifty years ago. Fifty years ago maybe it was a good thing for the country. It's not a good
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American Beauty Rose free enterprise gospel. 70 A revived form of social Dar-
winism has been implemented by a true believer who found a receptive constitu-
ency in Congress and among the public.
The deregulation policy-initiated, ironically, under President Carter-was
an important factor in creating a positive climate for mergers. Symbolizing a
distrust of "big government" and apprehension of inflation, 71 the endorsement
and active implementation by the Reagan Administration of deregulation was a
shrewd political maneuver whose most important function was to attract strong
support from conservative Democrats, the hard pressed middle class, and the
new yuppie set. The result was an agreement on the principle that business-not
government-should make the decisions that affect the marketplace. Accept-
ance of the principle that firms should have merger autonomy was assured.72
The public, benefitting from the breakdown of OPEC, the slowing of infla-
tion, and a productive economy, was receptive to Ronald Reagan's vision of
Adam Smith capitalism. Support for business autonomy also got a lift from the
emergence of a global market, a circumstance that permitted rationalizing merg-
ers as necessary counters to foreign competition. 73
B. The Reaction
Greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about
yourself.74
thing for the country today." Falk & Landauer, Nixon's Own Views on Antitrust Policy, Big Business
Didn't Require 17T Lobbying Blitz, Document Shows, Wall St. J., July 22, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
There were allegations of scandal. The Nixon Administration was accused of accepting
$400,000 from ITI to subsidize the 1972 Republican National Convention in San Diego in exchange
for the Government's settlement of antitrust cases against ITT. ITTDrive for Settlement ofAntitrust
Case is Described by Kleindienst and McLaren, Wall St. J., March 3, 1972, at 2, 4, col. 3; see Blake,
Beyond The 17T Case, HARPER'S MAG., June 1972, at 74, -74.
70. President Reagan's free market philosophy is described by two critics:
Bigness, especially when induced by mergers and acquisitions, marks the path to world-
class economic performance. It promotes efficiency and economies of scale in production.
It fosters technological invention and innovation. According to the President's Council of
Economic Advisors, mergers, takeovers, and the generalized "market for corporate con-
trol" discipline errant managements, transfer resources to higher-valued uses, and substi-
tute good management for bad.
Adams & Brock, The "New Learning"And The Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1515,
1519 (1986).
71. See Burnham, Regulatory Agencies And Competition, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1975, at 37, col.
1. For a more extensive analysis see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (analysis of dereg-
ulation of airline, trucking, natural gas, and telecommunications industries) (1982).
72. Fear that the "window of opportunity" created by the Administration's permissive antitrust
policy may close after the next election "has also inspired mergers of companies in the same busi-
ness." Wayne, 1986"s Legacy: Tumultuous Era For Big Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at 1,
col. 5, D5, col.3.
73. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. For a contrary view see Adams & Brock, supra
note 70, at 1537-40.
74. A quote attributed to Ivan Boesky, a Wall Street takeover expert caught and sentenced for
using inside information. "His greedy deals hurt thousands of other investors and rocked the pub-
lic's confidence in the stock market." An Insider Goes Inside, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly, Jan. 3, 1988,
at 27.
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1. Hostility To Merger Mania
The contemporary wave of merger mania is unique in the large number of
firms involved and the comprehensive reach into every market. The deals,
sometimes nourishing chicanery and indictments, 75 conjure up comparisons
with the tactics of the robber barons. Equally singular is the extensive contro-
versy over their consequences. The controversy is building a backlash toward
what is perceived as destructive merger mania. Greed is no longer chic. 7 6
With the resumption of the hostile raider versus management confronta-
tion, commentary parallels the arguments exchanged during the conglomeration
era.77 Management argues that it must sacrifice efficiency, innovation, and long-
range planning to resist money-grubbing raiders like Pickens and Goldsmith.78
Defensive strategy forces managers to turn to "short-term payoffs": "How can
anyone concentrate on doing what is needed for long-term competitiveness-
spending for plant and equipment, R&D, and job training-when they're so
busy battling for survival?"7 9 Hence managers argue that the constant pressure
from the raiders results in expedient and defensive management at the expense
of vision, risk, and internal growth.8 0
The raiders have a different interpretation; they contend that acquisitions
root out incompetent and slothful management.81 "Hostile takeovers serve a
useful economic and social role. They check corporate mismanagement by
75. See, eg., Kerr, 15 Employees Of Wall Street Firms Are Arrested On Cocaine Charges, N.Y.
Times, April 17, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
76. Barol, The Eighties Are Over, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1988, at 40. Hollywood confirmed the
public image of corruption and greed with the film Wall Street, originally entitled Greed. See The
Platoon Of Pros Who Helped Out On "Wall Street", BUs. WEEK, Dec. 21, 1987, at 38. Tom Wolfe
contributed THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITMES (1987), a book about sleazy Wall Street operatives.
See generally Groner, White-Collar Defense: D.C. s Hottest Specialty, LEGAL TIMES, April 13, 1987,
at I (growing legal practice defending corporations).
77. For recent literature on the debate see J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME (1987); J.
MADRICK, TAKING AMERICA (1987).
78. "The substantial amounts of money being channeled into hostile takeovers could be more
productively used to build companies and improve productivity rather than to liquidate and elimi-
nate." Kissinger, The Word For Takeover: Pernicious, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1986, at A35, col. 2.
Gone is talk of balanced, long-term growth; impatient shareholders and well-heeled
corporate raiders have seen to that. Now, anxious executives, fearing for their jobs or their
companies, are focusing their efforts on trimming operations and shuffling assets to im-
prove near-term profits, often at the expense of both balance and growth.
Winter, Trying To Streamline, Some Firms May Hurt Long-Term Prospects, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1987,
at 1, col. 6; see Adams & Brock, The Hidden Costs Of Failed Mergers, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987,
§ 3 (business), at 3, col. 1.
79. Jones & Berger, Do All These Deals Help or Hurt The U.S. Economy?, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 24,
1986, at 86, 86.
80. "The new order eschews loyalty to workers, products, corporate structure, businesses, fac-
tories, communities, even the nation. All such allegiances are viewed as expendable under the new
rules. With survival at stake, only market leadership, strong profits and a high stock price can be
allowed to matter." Prokesch, Remaking The American C.E.O., N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1987, § 3
(business), at 1, col. 2.
81. One economist sees the takeover wave as a goad to managers who have allowed their
companies
to get fat and inefficient because they are in mature industries that generate high cash flow
but can find few profitable places to put it. With low growth prospects, they should be
paying that money out to stockholders and letting them invest it. But instead, the USXs,
Carbides, oil and tobacco companies, and a host of others diversified into industries with
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threatening what executives value most: their jobs."'8 2
Others see a mixed bag of trade-offs. In an ironical reverse twist of the
synergy principle of "2+2=5"-used as a rationalization for conglomerating-
firms now are forced to sell old acquisitions to engage in "restructuring." The
objective is to create a more efficient and competitive core while stockpiling a
sufficient fund of financial resources to counter raiders.8 3 On the negative side,
restructuring can result in depressed personnel morale, 84 lay-offs, and a reduc-
tion in product consumption.85
Threading through the skirmishes over effects is the poltergeist of all
merger waves-market concentration. "In theory, mergers could hurt the econ-
omy by concentrating the resources of an industry in the hands of a few compa-
nies. With their stronger market positions, the survivors could gouge high
prices out of consumers."' 86
2. Reviving The Antimerger Minefield
A reaction to the wave is smoldering among a cross section of disenchanted
groups. Politicians and academics are positioning to control the form and
method of the response. Op-ed articles appear to spread the call for a new an-
timerger campaign.87 Advocates of Warren Court antitrust policy or of struc-
tural economics-who have been brooding in exile since their victory over
conglomeration-sense an opportunity to regain command of antitrust policy.
The common rallying point is Reagan Nonantitrust. Professor Shephard,
for example, says that under Reagan, "antitrust is in deep trouble," adding that:
the same problems: The result... was a huge waste of resources that makes society worse
off.
Jones & Berger, supra note 79, at 86-87.
82. Samuelson, The Super Bowl Of Scandal, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1986, at 64, 64.
83. Deal Mania, supra note 1, at 74, 76.
In deal after deal, the markets reward restructuring, which they identify with sharper cor-
porate goals. In a world of gluts and low growth, only the most competitive can prosper.
That usually means shrinking and stripping away tangential operations to return to the
core business, then producing the lowest-cost, best-quality product available anywhere.
Id.; see The Business Week Top 1000, Bus. WEEK, April 17, 1987, at 31.
84. "The lesson to remaining employees is clear: place less trust in the company. Wall Street's
advice to managers searching for excellence has been to tell them to become excellent at searching
for new jobs." Hirsch, So Much For Manager's Loyalty, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at A27, col. 2,
A27, col. 4.
85. Much of the market's gain goes to affluent individuals who devote only a small part of
any incremental income to consumption. Says Robert Eisner of Northwestern University:
"How can anyone say the market's rise is great for consumption when the gain is predi-
cated on takeovers that usually result in laying off thousands of workers with high propen-
sities to consume?"
Deal Mania, supra note 1, at 87.
86. Dobryzynski & Berger, For Better Or For Worse, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1987, at 38, 39.
Mergers are also blamed for a "slowdown in corporate gifts." Letter To The Editor, N.Y. Times,
July 30, 1987, at A24, col. 2.
87. Reich, On The Brink Of An Anti-Business Era, N.Y. Times, April 12, 1987, § 3 (business),
at 3, col. 1; Adams & Brock, supra note 78, at 3 col. 1; Green & Berry, Takeovers, A Symptom Of
"Corpocracy" N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1986, at A31, col. 1; Lodge, How Should We Kick Out Our Inept
Managers, Wash. Post Nat. Weekly, Dec. 22, 1986, at 28. The Green and Lodge advocacy of popu-
lism dates back to the Nader era of the 1960s and 1970s.
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"Since 1981 the Reaganists have pursued unproved theories developed at the
University of Chicago that supposedly foster competition and growth but actu-
ally promote monopoly."8 8 Willard Mueller writes that the "unprecedented
failure to execute the [antitrust] laws... and the decisions of the courts would
raise cries for impeachment if the laws involved private criminal behavior rather
than powerful corporate interests." 89 Ravenscraft and Scherer reject the "hy-
pothesis that the average merger or takeover yields significant improvements in
efficiency and operating unit performance." 90 Concerned with the euthanasia of
antitrust, Adams and Brock say that the justifications for merger permissive-
ness-the existence of global competition and a positive correlation between big-
ness and efficiency-are myths. They demand the "revitalization" of antitrust to
"combat the backwardness of bigness." 91 Structuralists are back in fashion with
attacks on market concentration and market power. 92
Now controlling Congress and aspiring to occupy the White House in 1989,
Democrats salivate over the opportunity to exploit a backlash by painting the
Republicans as the instigators of a wasteful merger wave. According to Presi-
dential candidate Jesse Jackson, "The challenge of our day is the merger ma-
niacs who eat up weak companies and measure their strength by absorption. '93
While the media amuses the public with tales of Wall Street skullduggery and
self-indulgent yuppies going to jail,94 a wide mixture of politicians and commen-
tators view merger gamesmanship as the inevitable consequence of morally
bankrupt Reaganomics. 95 In particular, they are seething over Reagan antitrust
policy as the source of moral corruption and the subversion of business ethics.9
6
The Senate and House Judiciary Committees have expressed concern. Pe-
ter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, complains that the
88. Shepherd, Bust The Reagan Trustbusters, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1986, at 225.
89. Mueller, Market Power and Its Control In The Food System, in ISSUES AFTER A CENTURY
OF FEDERAL COMPETITION POLICY 22, 35 (1987).
90. D. RAVENSCRAFT, F. SCHERER, THE LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF MERGERS AND
TAKEOVERS 17-18 (1986).
91. Adams & Brock, supra note 70, at 1566.
92. See IssuEs AFTER A CENTURY OF FEDERAL COMPETITION POLICY (1987) (essays extol-
ling the structural model and condemning the Chicago model); W. ADAMS & J. BROCK, THE BIG-
NESS COMPLEX (1986).
93. Fly, A Backlash Against Business Is Building-And the Democrats Know It, Bus, VEEK,
April 6, 1987, at 49.
94. See supra notes 74-75.
95. See, eg., Hightower, Where Greed, Unofficially Blessed By Reagan, Has Led, N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1987, at E-25, col. 1. Liberals blame Reaganism for yuppie materialism. See, e.g., Howe,
The Spirit Of The Times: Greed, Nostalgia, Ideologies & War Whoops, 33 DISSENT 413, 414-16
(1986).
96. Before he withdrew from-and re-entered-the campaign, presidential candidate Gary
Hart captured the theme by charging that the "business scandals are a direct consequence of the
Reagan Administration's lenient attitude toward enforcement of antitrust and securities laws." Fly,
supra note 93, at 49. Hart added: "It's a matter of the ethical values that this Administration has
been communicating to Wall Street and the country." Id.
New Deal liberal moralists are emerging from the woodwork to equate Reagan ideology with
Wall Street corruption. "The corporate buccaneers who now felt free to act out the ethos of Social
Darwinism could also preach that 'the free market' brought plenty to all (which didn't, however,
keep corporate America from pressing for every form of governmental hand out that would further
its economic interests)." Howe, supra note 95, at 415.
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Antitrust Division's performance in dealing with "the tremendous frenzy in
merger activity is woefully lacking."' 97 The revived Senate Antitrust Subcom-
mittee is chaired by Howard Metzenbaum, who charges that Reagan's "antitrust
record is a disaster," and vows to push for more active merger enforcement.98
Any doubts about the Democrats' antagonism towards Reagan antitrust policy
was settled when the House passed a bill that maintains per se liability for verti-
cal price-fixing. 99 This bill is a direct challenge to the Justice Department's rule
of reason recommendation.1 00
Getting a head start on Washington politicians, the National Association of
Attorneys General unanimously adopted merger guidelines designed to en-
courage enforcement. 10 1 The counterrevolution continued to attract momen-
tum when "experts gathered at a Virginia retreat to critique the federal
government's policies and to try to demonstrate that claims of revolution that
[have] forever transformed antitrust thinking are greatly exaggerated."'10 2
V. THE CHICAGO REVOLUTION
There is public and political support for the use of antitrust to inhibit
merger activity. Many of the antitrust counterrevolutionaries argue that the so-
lution is an antimerger campaign conducted under the imprimatur of Warren
Court precedent. Other activists would settle for reliance on the structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm in intervening in the merger market. A revival of
the antimerger crusade has a persuasive gloss; it worked against conglomeration
and, most importantly, favorable antimerger precedent is lying in wait in the
minefield. There is, however, a formidable obstacle: The Chicago School of
Economics.
97. Pasztor, Senate Panel Is Expected To Adopt Bill To Aid Federal Antitrust Enforcement,
Wall St. J., March 12, 1987, at 8, col. 2.
98. Hershey, Metzenbaum Vows Antitrust Push, Akron Beacon J., Jan. 8, 1987, at A-8, col. 1.
The full Judiciary Committee "will take a 'broad, philosophical look' at federal antitrust laws and
how they may be affecting the competitiveness of the United States." Biden Out To Leave His Mark
On Judiciary Panel, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
99. H.R. 585, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) (Freedom From Vertical Price Fixing Act); see
"House Committee Report On House-Passed Measure," Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) (Trade Cases), No.
835 (Nov. 16, 1987).
100. See Stall & Goldfein, "Counter Revolution"--Has It Begun?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1987, at 1,
col. 1.
101. The guideline's relevant market criteria result in higher market shares, thereby increasing
the probability of liability, and discount projected efficiencies. Pasztor, State Attorneys General Set
Guidelines Meant To Slow Pace of Major Takeovers, Wall St. J., March 11, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
102. Victor, Steam May Be Building For A Counterrevolution In Antitrust, Nat'l L.J., May 4,
1987, at 1, col. 1; see Moskowitz, Antitrust: The Pendulum Is Swinging Back, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 9,
1985, at 38; see also Special Report, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. (BNA) No. 1309, at 641 (April 2,
1987) (summarizing proposals of the Conference on Antitrust Alternative).
Another factor that encourages the counterrevolution movement is the public's disenchantment
with deregulation and what is perceived as detrimental consequences from mergers among public
service enterprises like airlines. Rolling Back Regulation, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 50; Re-Regulation
Rag, NEw REPUBLIC, May 18, 1987, at 5.
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A. The Chicago School Revolution
"Free enterprise antitrust" derives energy and direction from a symbiotic
exchange between conservative Reaganism and the ideology of the Chicago
School of Economics. As an ideological alliance of lawyers and economists, the
Chicago people are intent on revolutionizing antitrust according to the creed of
"efficiency economics." 103
Chicago teaches that in enforcing the antitrust laws, the first priority is
efficiency, "not legal rules designed to move the economy closer to a model of
atomistic competition."' 1 4 When business conduct results in efficiency, the con-
sumer benefits from lower prices, effective service, and better product quality.
Efficiency economists reject socioeconomic factors such as equality of opportu-
nity for small but less efficient firms. "Goals \based on something other than
efficiency (or its close proxy consumer's welfare) really call on judges to redis-
tribute income. How much consumers should contribute to small grocers is a
political choice." 105 Likewise, other political factors, like the Jeffersonian no-
tion that enterprise bigness exerts disproportionate and negative influence on
government, are irrelevant to the marketplace and antitrust and hence must de-
fer to efficiency.
Many of the scholarly advances of the efficiency school are the result of
disillusionment with formalistic structuralist doctrine. 106 Another target of the
Chicago school is the Warren Court's fuzzy sociological antitrust, 10 7 especially
the Court's commitment to counterproductive small firm protectionism.10 8 The
early true believers were a dedicated core of lawyers and economists who pub-
lished prolifically109 from academic centers like the University of Chicago and
Yale to build a network of zealous and energetic followers.' 10 Their analysis is
crisp, lucid, and focuses on the objectives of the cause."' It gives Chicago a
103. See Posner, The Chicago School OfAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). For
a critique of the "market approach" to law and life, see Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago:
Richard A. Posner And The Economic Analysis Of Law, 39 OHIO ST. L. REv. 439 (1978).
104. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1698 (1986).
105. Id. at 1703-04.
106. For the classic structuralist argument see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 44-58 (1959). Criticizing the structuralism of the 1950s and
60s, Posner observes: "Casual observation of business behavior, colorful characterizations (such as
the term 'barrier to entry'), eclectic forays into sociology and psychology, descriptive statistics, and
verification by plausibility took the place of the careful definitions and parsimonious logical structure
of economic theory." Posner, supra note 103, at 929.
107. See Austin, The Emergence Of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903 (1972).
108. Kauper, The "Warren Court"And The Antitrust Laws: OfEconomics, Populism, And Cyni-
cism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 330-34 (1968).
109. Judge Posner, a persuasive theorist and advocate of the cause, is perhaps the most prolific of
a prolific group. During 1980-83, he published an imposing collection of 22 law review articles.
Swygert & Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: Comparisons of Law School Productiv-
ity, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373, 382 n.39 (1985).
110. A critic concedes that "[i]t's the most important thing in legal education since the birth of
Harvard Law School." Barrett, A Movement Called "Law and Economics" Sways Legal Circles, Wall
St. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
111. Counterrevolutionaries are chagrined by Chicago's "simplicity."
My explanation for the lack of an effectively-organized proantitrust position has to do with
my sense that the "beauty" of the Chicago case is its simplicity and that the difficulty of the
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distinct advantage in a comparison with the muddled value judgments of the
Warren Court opinions, the Naderites,112 and the "genteel populists."'1 13
A devotion to the dynamic supply and demand values of free enterprise
furnished a foundation for a natural affinity between conservative Republicans
and efficiency economists. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980,114 the
network left the underground of academe and entered the corridors of power.
During the ensuing years the network exploited a strong commitment to the
cause to introduce their philosophy into law and economic policy.
Chicago was mainstreamed into antitrust enforcement by William Baxter, a
pragmatic professor from Stanford Law School, who practiced his convictions as
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division Chief. "Only the most prescient
could have predicted the boldness with which Professor Baxter has implemented
his policy."1 15 One of his convictions is that the marketplace will Schumpeter-
ize and become competitive from its own creative convolutions.1 6 Following
the Chicago decree that mergers are neutral or procompetitive, Clayton 7 was
mothballed.'1 7 The Chicago School's campaign has become known as an anti-
trust "revolution," prompting such headlines as "Recent Merger Cases Reflect
Revolution In Antitrust Policy." 118
With the help of friends in academe, Baxter worked to discredit the struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm.1 9 On the second floor of Tenth Street
proantitrust view-and of antitrust itself-is its complexity. In Chicago's simplicity, the
real world operates almost like a textbook example of perfect competition. Competition is
good; virtually all observed monopoly power is justified; mergers only occur if they im-
prove efficiency; and so on.
Waldman, Consulting And Reagan Antitrust, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. (No.4) 36, 37 (1986).
112. See Austin, The Closed Enterprise System: The Nader Study Group Report On Antitrust
Enforcement (Book Comment), 23 CASE W. RES. 678 (1972).
113. See, e.g., S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974); G. LODGE, THE NEW AMERICAN
IDEOLOGY (1975).
114. "The political development that has helped turn antitrust enforcement of the 1970's upside
down and made it, in a sense, more leisurely was the arrival of the Reagan administration and its
view that business is essentially good." Elias, Scales Tip Against Antitrust Statutes, Insight (Wash.
Times), June 15, 1987, at 8, 11.
115. Bickel, The Antitrust Division's Adoption Of A Chicago School Economic Policy Calls For
Some Reorganization: But Is The Division's New Policy Here To Stay? 20 Hous. L. REV. 1083, 1099
(1983); see also Gellhorn, Baxter In The Pantheon Of Antitrust, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 16, col. 1
(evaluating Baxter's record as Antitrust Division Chief).
116. Schumpeter believed that monopoly often occurs but eventually dissipates under the pres-
sure of "creative destruction," a process of "industrial mutation" that "incessantly revolutionizes the
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.
This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism." J. SCHUMPETER, CAPI-
TALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1962) (footnote omitted).
117. "Merger enforcement by the Division and the F.T.C. from 1982-1986, as a percentage of
reported transactions has been running at 28% of the level of 1979-1980." 52 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 422 (March 5, 1987). Noting that merger enforcement had dropped during the
1980s, Robert Pitofsky observed: "It was anticipated that this lenient drift would continue under the
Reagan Administration, but few predicted just how lenient the policy would become. Mergers
among giant competitors regularly have been cleared .... At times, people could not help wonder-
ing if the Administration would ever meet a merger it did not like." Pitofsky, Coke And Pepsi Were
Going Too Far, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1986, at F2, col. 1.
118. Leddy, Recent Merger Cases Reflect Revolution in Antitrust Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 3,
1986, at 17.
119. In disdaining the quantitative test from United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
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and Constitution Avenue, as well as next door at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion,120 the structure-conduct-performance model became persona non grata.
The bottom line: "The antitrust laws as enforced by the government are the
most lenient in 50 years." 121 To Chicago people, "lenient" means rational, with
power over price and consumer welfare the criteria for enforcement of Clayton
7.
The judicial appointments of some of the brightest conservative scholars is
providing an opportunity to spread the new economic culture in a range of ar-
eas.122 Former Chicago Law Professor Antonin Scalia is on the Supreme Court
while prominent intellects like Easterbrook, Winter, and Posner are now on the
federal circuit courts. 123 As a result, "a small number of brilliant Reagan
judges, many in their 30's and early 40's, are carrying the law and economics
crusade into the courts." 124 The Chicago judges are supported in their free mar-
ket cause by a group of "rising stars" in academe and Congress.' 25
B. Rule of Reason: Chicago's Trojan Horse
True believers use the per se/rule of reason characterizations to feed their
ideology into antitrust. The conclusive presumption of a per se characterization
supports proscription, while the rule of reason favors flexible judgments on en-
forcement. Because it renders the defendant's activities illegal "without elabo-
rate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use,"1 26 a per se rule is anathema to the aspirations of Chicago econom-
ics. 12 7 It is abhorred by Chicago people because it allows-even encourages-
321 (1963), Baxter said, "However, such analysis largely reflects, I believe, the static structuralism
found in the economic literature of the 1930's and 1940's pertaining to competitive behavior and
concentration, as well as a desire to simplify the analysis of such transactions for reasons of judicial
economy." Merger Enforcement Policy-Antitrust Division, 1 50,435 CCH Analysis at 55991 (1982).
120. At the F.T.C., the Chairman "has serious questions about the need for antitrust laws."
Dwyer, Thunder From The Right At The Federal Trade Commission, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1987, at
139.
121. Elias, supra note 114, at 11. "The so-called 'new antitrust'-marked by a significant decline
in government enforcement-has gained momentum from the increasingly widespread adoption of
the Chicago School of Economics marketplace-efficiency approach, along with the deregulatory fer-
vor of the last five years." Middleton, "New Antitrust"Era Takes Shape, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 13, 1986, at
1, col. 2.
122. "Yet Reagan's deepest impact on the courts will be made not by the many Reaganites at the
district level but by a small group of exceptionally smart and influential legal theoreticians he has
appointed to the courts of appeal." Norton, Reagan's Imprint On The Courts, FORTUNE, Nov. 24,
1986, at 121.
123. As a lightning rod for charges that he ignores precedent while favoring Chicago ideology,
Posner is the most controversial Reagan appointment. See, e.g., Riley, Has Judge Posner Gone Too
Far? Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Easterbrook and Posner are "showing signs of dominat-
ing" the Seventh Circuit. Middleton, Shaping A Circuit In The Chicago School inage, Nat'l L.J.,
July 20, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
124. Norton, supra note 122, at 124; see Note, All The President's Men? A Study 0fRonald
Reagan's Appointments To The US. Courts Of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987).
125. "The Reagan administration's appointment of venerated conservative scholars to judge-
ships or administration posts has opened the way for other law school academicians to gain greater
prominence and influence as intellectual gurus of both the administration and the New Right."
Graham, Conservative Academics: Rising Stars, LEGAL TiMEs, March 18, 1985, at 1, 11, col, 1.
126. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
127. Posner complains that the per se price-fixing rule has been transformed into a conspiracy
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courts to make result-oriented conclusions by channeling "facts" into the per se
loop. Warren Court merger decisions are virtual per se holdings.1 28  Con-
versely, the elasticity of the rule of reason approach provides the opportunity for
dialogue over acceptable market behavior and thus provides a forum for compet-
ing ideologies. The rule of reason is the Trojan Horse that Chicago uses to intro-
duce its ideology into the citadels of policy and enforcement.
Those who detect a drift towards Chicago antitrust analysis point to the
increasing reliance by courts on the rule of reason analysis. 129 The contention is
that the easy task of satisfying the liability presumptions of the Warren Court
have been replaced with a searching review of competitive effects. Accordingly,
the primary focus is now on efficiency, in contrast with previous presumptions
derived from market structure or a priori assumptions.
VI. ARGUMENTS FOR THE COUNTERREVOLUTION
A. The Stakes Are High
The merger wave is not slowing down. 130 A few deals were lost after the
crash of 1987,131 but as one takeover specialist observed, "The basic velocity of
deals is here to stay."'132 New takeover strategies evolve, such as the growing
attractiveness of American firms to foreign investors.' 33 Public anxiety contin-
ues to focus on the takeover issue and mergers are held responsible for every-
thing from labor problems to airplane wrecks.' 34 The lack of antimerger
case, which ignores "the economics of price-fixing .... " R. POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN EcO-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 25 (1976).
128. The "quantitative" structural test of United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963), is an example. "[IWn any case in which it is possible, without doing violence to the congres-
sional objective embodied in § 7, to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so ...." Id.
at 362.
129. Chicago critics argue that "rule of reason" constitutes a bias in favor of legality, i.e., a
Trojan Horse for Chicago anti-antitrust policy. "Business practices tested under a full rule of rea-
son, with no presumptions based on any set of facts and with the burden of showing anticompetitive
effect on the plaintiff, will usually turn out to be legal." Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust
Analysis Of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1978).
130. See Who's Afraid Of The Big Bad Bear? Not The Dealmakers, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 16, 1987,
at 62; Burrough, Reports of Takeover Demise Are Greatly Exaggerated, Wall St. J., June 26, 1987, at
6, col. 1; Raiders Smell Blood In Crash's Aftermath, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
131. The mood was summarized by an investment banker who observed: "There is a high de-
gree of uncertainty about whether deals will hold.' " Cohen, Investors Are Increasingly Skeptical
That Many Takeovers Will Be Completed, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 4, col. 2 (quoting Joseph
Perella, cohead of investment banking at First Boston Corp.).
132. Brill, Deal Makers See Quick Rebound For Law Practices, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1987, at
6.
This year may well be the year of the big-boys-whether cash-rich corporations or cash-
rich raiders. One of the biggest pushes is expected to come from large, well-capitalized
corporations that feel compelled to consolidate within their industry before the Reagan
Administration, and possibly its relaxed antitrust stance, ends.
Wayne, Takeovers Return To The Old Mode, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at D4, col.3.
133. For Sale: America, TIME, Sept. 14, 1987, at 52; Lublin, British Firms Step Up Takeover
Action In U.S., Wall St. J., June 15, 1987, at 13, col. 1; Rosen, The Explosion In International
Mergers And Acquisitions, 71 A.B.A. J., May 1985, at 70 (1985).
134. Rowen, Bring Back Regulation, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly, Aug. 31, 1987, at 5, col. I; In-
dustry Groups Blame Deregulation For Diminished Safety By Air Carriers, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1337, at 626 (Oct. 22, 1987). Mergers are also blamed for "price-setting" among
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enforcement by the Administration is still a lightning rod for a
counterrevolution.
Whether the Rehnquist Supreme Court would support an antitrust merger
counterrevolution campaign is a hot topic when antitrust experts-many of
whom are moving into other fields-congregate. 135 The competing choices are
as antithetical as at anytime in the history of the antitrust movement: the
revolution of the efficiency economics of Chicago battling a counterrevolution
sustained by those who espouse a liberal-populist antitrust antimerger policy.
The stakes are high: if the Chicago School can repulse the counterrevolution,
Clayton 7 will, in effect, be repealed. Victory by the Chicago school could also
mean the demise of antitrust as a significant factor in the marketplace. Adam
Smith, John D. Rockefeller, and Professor Schumpeter-wherever they are cur-
rently residing-would no doubt toast the victory.
B. Prospects for a Successful Antimerger Counterrevolution
Ironically, a Clayton 7 antimerger revival can achieve success by exploiting
the Reagan administration's benign enforcement strategy. The real test, how-
ever, forces the counterrevolutionaries to assume that Judges Posner t3 6 and Eas-
terbrook 137 are wrong in concluding that Chicago has achieved a "victory" at
the Supreme Court level. As a result, the Rehnquist Court would follow the
antimerger precedent, ignore Chicago, and influence the federal system to do
likewise.
1. The Irony: Chicago Pays a Price For the Administration's
Benign Enforcement
A conviction that mergers are presumptively procompetitive and a disdain
for Warren Court ideology has resulted in a paucity of Clayton 7 complaints by
the Reagan administration. Baxter and his successors at the Antitrust Division
have practiced the Adam Smith philosophy that rejects government interference
with the marketplace generally and with mergers in particular. 138 While this
strategy is consistent with the Administration's policy, it does not produce case
precedent. Despite a revolution, Chicago cannot cite a single Clayton 7 prece-
dent of consequence. Baxter and his successors have allowed the Warren Court
rival carriers. Salpukas, Climbing Air Fares Stir Wide Concerns, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1987, at 1, col.
1.
135. "The antitrust practice of many firms has dropped off sharply since the beginning of the
Reagan Administration in 1981, forcing lawyers to scramble for work in other specialties." Antitrust
Lawyers Get Less Work As Rules Ease, L. A. Times, March 24, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
136. Posner, The Rule Of Reason And The Economic Approach: Reflections On The Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1977).
137. Easterbrook, Foreward: The Court And The Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59
(1984).
138. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. This lack of litigation may be somewhat
misleading. Although no longer inclined to litigate, the Antitrust Division does negotiate "restruc-
turing" of the merger to meet the Department's criteria. This means that one of the merging firms
must divest an affiliate firm. Sullivan, A New Role: In Reviewing Mergers, The Antitrust Division Has
Become An Economic Regulator, Nat'l L.J., May 18, 1987, at 13, col. 1.
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minefield and the Burger Court structural decisions to remain intact-available
for use by the counterrevolutionaries.
2. Has Chicago Co-Opted The Supreme Court?
The side that dictates the ideology of the rule of reason will win the conflict.
An acceptance of Chicago's version of the rule of reason by the Court is an
implicit acceptance of Chicago's judgment that mergers are presumptively neu-
tral or procompetitive. In the face of a Chicago Court, pursuing an antimerger
counterrevolution would be superfluous.
The counterrevolutionaries can make a plausible argument that the Court's
rule of reason/per se dialogue does not favor Chicago. A reading of the cases
confirms Professor Arthur's judgment that the Supreme Court has consistently
expressed a split personality in antitrust matters and that over the years the rule
of reason/per se labels are often illusory or conflicting. 139 He makes an analogy
to the split personality heroine in The Three Faces of Eve, 14° and concludes that
the Court wears three faces: sometimes it follows precedent, sometimes it fol-
lows economic theory, and sometimes it engages in "policymaking." 14 1
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 142 the Court
adopted a "precedent" personality to strike down a professional association's
ban on competitive bidding. Although the Court spoke rule of reason language,
the defendant's argument that the restraint was in the public's interest was sum-
marily rejected in deference to a string of precedent which held that competi-
tion, not competitors, should determine prices and hence price-fixing was per se
illegal.143 The next personality was a carryover of the efficiency theme of Conti-
nental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Ina.144 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System (BMI) 145 blanket licensing arrangements that could have
fallen into the per se category under precedent were exonerated, because the
effect was to reduce costs, and the restraints were "a necessary consequence of
139. Arthur, Farewell To The Sea Of Doubt: Jettisoning The Constitutional Sherman Act, 74
CALIF. L. REv. 263, 309-17 (1986). Professor Arthur joins Edward Mason who said:
Pareto once remarked that the statements of Karl Marx are like bats; from one angle they
resemble birds while from another view they look like mice. This observation is equally
appropos with respect to antitrust decisions. It is possible for the skillful reader to buttress
almost any preconceived notion of what the antitrust laws are about by judicious citation of
chapter and verse.
E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 391 (1959).
140. C. THIGPEN & H. CLECKLEY, THE THREE FACES OF EVE (1957).
141. Arthur, supra note 139, at 310.
142. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
143. The Court wrote:
The fact that engineers are often involved in large-scale projects significantly affecting the
public safety does not alter our analysis. Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially
dangerous goods and services would be tantamount to repeal of the statute .... The
judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against this harm by conferring monopoly
privileges on the manufacturers.
Id. at 695-96.
144. 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
145. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the integration necessary to achieve ... efficiencies .. . . 146
The Court continued to split its antitrust personality. A basic principle of
Chicago's rule of reason is that maximum resale price fixing can be procompeti-
tive and, therefore, should not be per se illegal.147 The Supreme Court has long
disagreed.1 48 With the GTE Sylvania and BMI decisions on the books, the
Court appeared headed on a one-way trip to Chicago to reverse precedent. In-
stead, the Court detoured. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 149 a
case involving horizontal price fixing, the Court flatly rejected a rule of reason
analysis built around efficiencies resulting from cost containment. One commen-
tator called the opinion "retrogressive: it champions a wooden, mechanical view
of the per se rule and fails to recognize the full range of circumstances in which
trade restraints may promote competition."' 50 To further confound Chicago,
the Court gratuitously reaffirmed precedent on resale maximum price fixing.' 51
Two years later, both Chicago and their opponents received obfuscated sig-
nals from Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,'5 2 in which four con-
curring Justices urged that the per se rule on tie-ins be abandoned and that
inquiry be directed to "economic effects, and the potential economic benefits" of
the restraint. 153 Even the majority opinion by Justice Stevens reduced the rigor
of the per se standard by making the critical market power requirement more
difficult to meet.' 5 4
Professor Arthur concluded that the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish
was an unsatisfactory "Jekyll and Hyde" blending of the "law" and "economic"
personalities. The per se characterization was retained as a concession to prece-
dent (law), while Justice Stevens used a "forcing" theory to rationalize a finding
of insufficient market power (economic).155 Justice Stevens did not, as Arthur
146. Id. at 21.
147. See, eg., Posner, supra note 136, at 10-12 (discussing the per se tie-in rule and franchise
distribution system). "Maximum resale price fixing has none of the potential anticompetitive conse-
quences of horizontal maximum price fixing .... Moreover, maximum resale price fixing has a
competitive benefit that does not occur in cases of horizontal maximum price fixing: The maximum
resale price prevents distributors from exploiting territories given to them by manufacturers." Eas-
terbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 886, 890 n. 20 (1981); see also Posner, supra
note 103, at 925 (summarizing the central tenets of the Chicago school, including resale price
maintenance).
148. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 377-88 (1977).
149. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
150. Gerhart, The Supreme Court And Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph Of The Chicago
School, 1982 Sup. Or. REv. 319, 344.
151. Maricopia County, 457 U.S. at 347-48. William Baxter's reaction was succinct; he called
the decision "very, very stupid and unfortunately so." Antitrust Chief Suggests Price-Fixing Law
Won't Be Enforced In Some Circumstances, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
152. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
153. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Justice Stevens concluded that 30% control over the tying product was "far from over-
whelming." Id. at 26.
155. Arthur, supra note 139, at 311-12. The Circuit Court held that the Hospital's draw of
approximately 30% of patients in the relevant market supplied sufficient market power to justify per
se liability. Justice Stevens, noting that the patients generally were indifferent to price or quality,
concluded that under these conditions, the Hospital could not "force" consumers to buy something
that they would not otherwise purchase. He wrote:
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correctly notes, apply Chicago economics, which considers tying arrangements
to be presumptively procompetitive.1' 6 Arthur summarizes:
Indeed, if economic analysis were to be applied consistently to
tying doctrine, the per se approach would have to be discarded alto-
gether, for it is clear that at least some tie-ins are output-increasing
arrangements which "make consumers better off." The Hyde major-
ity's refusal to consider this basic economic objection to the tying per
se rule, while employing economic analysis to find the rule inapplicable
to the specific dispute, gives its opinion a distinctly split personality.157
Several months later, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, s5 8 Justice Stevens relied on Robert Bork's "entity" theory of cooper-
ative competition 159 to apply the rule of reason to behavior "ordinarily con-
demned as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach . . . ."16 The
analysis was economic; Justice Stevens discerned the existence and use of market
power to limit output, enhance prices, and thwart consumer preference.' 61 Un-
able to demonstrate efficiencies, the defendant's other defenses crumbled.' 62
In 1985 the Supreme Court blended populism and efficiency economics in
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. 163 Jus-
tice Brennan, one of the populist holdovers from the Warren Court, accepted the
relevance of efficiency analysis in boycott cases. He nevertheless ostensibly re-
tained the per se criteria of proof of market power, coercive motive, and adverse
effect. 164 In this case, the criteria were not satisfied. Most interesting was Bren-
If consumers lack price consciousness, that fact will not force them to take an anesthesiolo-
gist whose services they do not want-their indifference to price will have no impact on
their willingness or ability to go to another hospital where they can utilize the services of
the anesthesiologist of their choice. Similarly, if consumers cannot evaluate the quality of
anesthesiological services, it follows that they are indifferent between certified anesthesiolo-
gists even in the absence of a tying arrangement-such an arrangement cannot be said to
have foreclosed a choice that would have otherwise been made "on the merits."
Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 28.
156. Arthur, supra note 139, at 312-13.
157. Arthur, supra note 139, at 313 (footnote omitted).
158. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
159. Id. at 101 (citing R. Bonn, THE ANTrrRusr PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WrrH ITSELF
(1978)).
160. Id. at 100.
161. Arguably, Stevens in effect expunged per se by merging it with rule of reason.
Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Perse
rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies
a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. For example, while the Court has spoken of a
"per se" rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have
procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable
market analysis.
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26; see Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents AndA Truncated Rule of Reason:
Retaining Flexibility Without Sacrificing Efficiency, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 193 (1985).
162. "The District Court did not find that the NCAA's television plan produced any procompe-
titive efficiencies which enhanced the competitiveness of college football television rights .... There
is therefore no predicate in the findings for petitioner's efficiency justification." NCAA, 468 U.S. at
114.
163. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
164. Id. at 290-95. The dominant theme was proof of market power, rather than motive. "Of
course, the purpose underlying the challenged conduct is always relevant to a rule of reason inquiry,
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nan's use of efficiency analysis to implicate the Warren Court's populist ideals of
mom-and-popism. "The cost savings and order-filling guarantees enable smaller
retailers to reduce prices and maintain their retail stock so as to compete more
effectively with larger retailers." 165
3. A Counterrevolution Interpretation
The most favorable scenario for the liberal-populist position is that Chicago
did not ride the coattails of GTE Sylvania to gain complete command of
Supreme Court antitrust analysis. Subsequent decisions are scattered according
to Professor Arthur's "Three Faces of Eve" split personality thesis, leaving an
erratic trail of confusion. Arguably, any drift to Chicago is more cosmetic than
substantive. Hence, despite the optimistic assumptions of the Chicago propo-
nents, the Court has not, as reflected in the traditional analysis of Maricopa,
expunged the per se characterization from the antitrust lexicon.
Moreover, a conversion to rule of reason analysis does not necessarily settle
the conflict to Chicago's advantage. The elimination of the varied and often
mysterious permutations of per se presumptions shifts the focus of debate to the
development of a more flexible system of rules.166 Structuralism and populism
would still compete with Chicago. Interestingly, the last major confrontation
for control of the rule of reason ideology was won by the liberal-populists. 167
Reference to efficiency may be misleading. Efficiency is an open-ended
word which, like any economic term, can be manipulated.1 68 As noted, Justice
Brennan used efficiency as a vehicle to advocate the sociological interests of
mom and pop, a populist value disdained by Chicago. On the other hand, critics
and evidence of motive plays a particularly helpful role in assessing the credibility of the defendant's
efficiency arguments. Nevertheless, market power, not motive, plays center stage in contemporary
antitrust analysis." Brunett & Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After North-
west Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches To Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and Boy-
cotts, 72 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1044 (1986).
165. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295.
166. Expanding analysis into the swamp of competitive effect under rule of reason may generate
a reverse effect. Lengthy, costly, and complex litigation will result in efforts to "streamline rule of
reason analysis," perhaps ultimately leading to a return to "hard-boiled rule of reason" criteria or
even per se. Popofsky & Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 195, 196 (1987).
167. In the 1950s a campaign by what Alfred Kahn called the "new critics" sought to counter
the per se condemnation of business size and monopoly power expressed in Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (1945). The new critics
offered a more flexible "workable... competition" standard that would consider effects "in terms
either of concrete economic results or of the continuing vitality of competitive forces in the market as
a whole." Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman And Clayton Acts, 63
YALE L.J. 293, 294-95 (1954). The "new critics" lost to the populism and structuralism of the
Warren Court. See Austin, Book Review, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 193, 201 (1987).
168. Manipulation is conducted under the "black box" doctrine. "You can't argue about what's
inside my black box le., economic model] because I made it. The God's truth isn't in the black box,
I am the God's truthl" But Ceteris Are Never Paribus, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 22, 23 (remark
attributed to Franco Modigliani, M.I.T. economist). Economists are noted for intradisciplinary con-
frontation, accusing the "other side" of self-serving biased work, and charging critics with serving as
instruments of evil forces. See, eg., J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PuBLIc PURPOSE (1973);
A. LINDBECK, THE POLrnCAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW LEFT: AN OUTSIDERS VIEW (1971); W.
WEiSSKOPF, ALIENATION AND ECONOMICS (1971).
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contend that Chicago's desiderata of consumer welfare-efficiency is a dangerous
Trojan horse hiding a big business bias that is in fact detrimental to consum-
ers. 169 This assertion suggests that efficiency could become an Orwellian term
easily twisted to conform to value judgments, prompting more split personality
opinions. Moreover, citations to Chicago people lose vitality and original rigor
when the economics are filtered through the various biases of the Justices. This
is, for example, the legacy of the Hyde decision, which left a mangled and myste-
rious per se rule for tie-ins. 170
Translating Chicago's efficiency language into merger analysis will create
debate. Whether this translation can, or should, be done, is the subject of con-
troversy, even among Chicago proponents. Robert Bork rejects direct consider-
ation of efficiencies, 171 but others deem it necessary for credible analysis. 172 The
case law is contradictory, with some decisions suggesting that the creation of
efficiencies is reason to proscribe a merger.173 If the Court, for lack of expertise
and with aspiration for simplicity and economy, opted to avoid the efficiencies
swamp, the advantage would go to the counterrevolutionaries: without an up-
front efficiency analysis, structure and other value judgments, including those
from Warren Court precedent, would dominate.
C. Other Factors Favoring the Counterrevolution
One factor that may deter significant revision of precedent is the unique
character of a merger. Conduct violations, such as tie-ins, boycotts, and price
fixing, are transactions that are relatively comprehensible in terms of identifying
effects on markets. Litigants in tie-in cases, for example, can produce a record of
efficiencies, price discrimination, "coercion," or "foreclosure." This evidence
usually provides sufficient information to make judgments on what effects
should be relevant to antitrust liability. 174
169. A commentator wrote:
Judge Bork thus defines "consumers" to include monopolists and cartels. Antitrust based
on Judge Bork's definition of "consumer welfare" makes no distinction between real con-
sumers-the purchasers of goods and services-and the firms with market power that raise
prices and thereby extract wealth from purchasers. Higher prices to consumers are fine
with Judge Bork as long as the monopolist or the cartel produces efficiently.
Lande, An Anti-Antitrust Activist?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 7, 1987, at 13, 28, col. 1.
170. Even before Hyde, the tie-in was recognized as a "mysterious phenomenon which is not
wholly understood by anyone." G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER
THE SHERMAN Aar 53 (1958).
171. "[S]ince the elements of the trade-off between output restriction and efficiency gain cannot
be studied directly," Bork subsumes efficiency under "general legal rules." R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRusT PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WrH ITSELF 219 (1978). He would make "presumptively
lawful all horizontal mergers up to market shares that would allow for other mergers of similar size
in the industry and still leave three significant companies." Id. at 221-22.
172. Berg, Cost Efficiencies In The Section 7 Calculus: A Review Of The Doctrine, 37 CASE W.
REs. 218 (1986).
173. F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Berg concludes that the discussion of efficiencies in these cases is
dicta. Berg, supra note 172, at 233.
174. There is, as might be expected, controversy over what effects should be relevant to liability
for imposing ties. The Chicago people give priority to efficiency, Bowman, Tying Arrangements And
The Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20 (1957), while the cases have focused on foreclosure, and
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Mergers are different, with a special mystique that conjures up imagery of
warfare, greed, and skullduggery. With the possible exception of large horizon-
tal consolidations, reasonably accurate judgments about the effects of mergers
on competition are impossible. Basic issues, such as determination of relevant
markets, are lost in guerrilla warfare between hired gun experts. 175 Without
reliable judgments on competitive effects, other factors are drawn into the in-
quiry. The liability discussion is further expanded by the fact that mergers are
more of a national political issue than an antitrust issue. As part of the
benchmarks of history, they attract interest from every discipline. Historians,
political scientists, and casual observers have said as much about mergers as
economists and lawyers.' 76
Under these conditions, societal antitrust, populism, and quantitative struc-
turalism are never obsolete and are as relevant as Chicago economics. The de-
bate over the impact of merger mania on managers, shareholders, and investors
has at least subliminal impact on the judiciary, perhaps cultivating an an-
timerger bias. The historical relevance of these and other factors gives the cycle
theory of antitrust credibility. Hence, while Chicago presently may have an
edge as the conventional wisdom of the chic, "the historical record suggests that
any form of vigorous antipopulism has a limited political life-span .... Popu-
lism continues to enjoy support among academic commentators and within Con-
gress and the judiciary, and its resurgence simply awaits the right set of political
circumstances." 17 7
VII. ARGUMENTS FOR CHICAGO AND THE DEMISE OF ANTITRUST
A solid argument supports Judge Posner's conclusion that Chicago has won
the struggle against what has been labeled "Coonskin" (liberal-populist) anti-
trust. 178 Chicago disciples, ensconsced in the White House for two terms, have
exploited the leverage of an influential forum to spread the new creed. Members
of the Chicago network are distributed among key federal circuit courts where
their intelligence, stamina, and scholarship exert influence. Their academics
continue an unrelenting effort to control the marketplace of ideas. 179 In addi-
"the polar concepts of coercion and free choice [rather] than ... with the efficiency or allocation
consequences of competitive structure and process." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 148, at 445.
175. Professor Phillip Areeda is quoted as saying: "Often, I'm sorry to say, economists testify to
points they would be ashamed to publish in professional journals for the scrutiny of their col-
leagues."' Schifrin, Antitrust And Industrial Organization: The Loss of Idealism And Leadership
(1I), 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. (No. 4) 43, 61 (1986) (quoting Areeda).
176. Justice Douglas attached an Art Buchwald article on mergers to United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 553-55 (1966) (appendix to concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas,
reprinted from Wash. Post, June 2, 1966 at A21).
177. Baker & Blumenthal, Ideological Cycles and Unstable Antitrust Rules, 31 ANTITRUST
BULL. 323, 333 (1986).
178. Posner, supra note 136, at 13. "Coonskin" antitrust is Fortune's description of Justice
Black's interpretation of Clayton 7. Editorial. Antitruft in a Coonskin Cap, FORTUNE, July 1966, at
65.
179. Chicago critics subvert their own cause. Dedication to the free market rewards of consult-
ing is a factor in draining the scholarly resources of the counterrevolution. The majority of Indus-
trial Organization economists-the group most concerned with antitrust-are counter-
revolutionaries who would be expected to lead in the production of scholarship. Production, how-
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tion to scholarship, a network of efficiency-oriented conferences convey the
message to judges, young faculty, and lawyers.1 80 However significant these
successes are, the key to a long-standing or conclusive victory rests with control
of the Supreme Court.
A. Chicago's Trojan Horse Has Gained Access to the Supreme Court
The most significant Supreme Court citation for Chicago School success is
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.181 In reversing its ten year prece-
dent of per se liability for vertical territorial restraints, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly endorsed the efficiency rationalization. The "'redeeming virtues' [of
efficiencies in distribution of products] are implicit in every decision sustaining
vertical restrictions under the rule of reason."' 182 The Court's embrace of a rule
of reason efficiency test foreshadows the demise of per se analysis in other verti-
cal restraints such as tie-ins and maximum price control. For example, Hyde is
a tentative step in the process of conversion to Chicago.
Efficiency advocates like Judge Posner interpreted the GTE Sylvania deci-
sion as a victory for Chicago. Posner wrote:
One must not read a Supreme Court opinion like a bond indenture, but
it does appear that the Court is implying that antitrust prohibitions
must have an economic rationale and that the aesthetic delights of
smallness and the yearning to resurrect a nation of sturdy Jeffersonian
yeomen will not be permitted to decide antitrust cases. This impres-
sion is reinforced by the frequency of the Court's citations to the writ-
ings of members of the "Chicago School," like Bork and me, who
argue that economic efficiency is the only goal of antitrust law.18 3
Writing in 1984-seven years after Posner-then Professor, now Judge, Easter-
brook confirmed the trend: "Times have changed. In the 1983 Term the anti-
trust opinions read like short treatises on microeconomic analysis. All of the
Justices asked economic questions, such as whether the arrangements in ques-
tion increased prices by cutting back output.' 18 4
Since GTE Sylvania, the rule of reason has been the primary issue in the
Court's antitrust decisions. Literal characterization-if it looks like price-fixing,
it is conclusively presumed per se illegal-is viewed as misleadingly simplistic
ever, is reduced by the fear of alienating potential clients. "Where's a strong income maximum in
the 10 [Industrial Organization] field, an incentive to protect one's income earning potential. You
don't say things that are going to keep you off one of the two sides of the street .... " Schifrin, supra
note 175, at 62.
180. The most controversial is Professor Manne's Law and Economics Center at George Mason
University, which conducts intensive Chicago School programs for federal judges. See Guzzard,
Judges Discover The World of Economics, FORTUNE, May 21, 1979, at 58. Another significant con-
duit for Chicago-conservative policy is the Federalist Society whose membership includes the main
influences in Chicago economics. Abramson, Right Place At The Right Time, AM. LAw., June 1986,
at 99.
181. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
182. Id. at 54.
183. Posner, supra note 136, at 13.
184. Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 59.
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and overbroad.18 5 The ongoing debate among the Justices recognizes and ex-
plores the ideological and practical ramifications of switching liability tests from
per se to rule of reason. Chicago scholarship is frequently cited.' 8 6 In sum-
mary, the basis exists for a plausible argument that the anti-efficiency bias of the
Warren Court has been replaced with a pro-efficiency inclination. Judge Posner
is correct; GTE Sylvania was a major victory for Chicago and it established a
theme and frame of reference for future antitrust analysis "Chicago style."
Although there have been instances of "split personality," the Court contin-
ues to ask economic questions. Rarely does Warren Court populism intrude.
With several exceptions, the Justices seek to restrict antitrust evaluation to com-
petition, rather than sociology or judgments on proper income redistribution.
For example, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 187 a unani-
mous Court restricted analysis of a monopolization claim to a "harm to compe-
tition" standard while citing Bork's efficiency analysis to uphold a jury verdict
for the plaintiffL188 The Court likewise supported Chicago's concern with the
negative effects of self-serving and frivolous private enforcement' 8 9 by tightening
standing requirements and by eliminating the Pollar rule which gave plaintiffs an
advantage on summary judgment motions. 190
B. The Kennedy Factor
While Robert Bork personifies Chicago economics and Judge Ginsburg is a
dedicated supporter, 19 1 Justice Kennedy's vision of antitrust is considerably less
focused. Ginsburg and Bork are scholars with Chicago antitrust track records;
185. See, eg., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
186. Justice White noted the majority's frequent citation of Posner. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at
69-70 (White, J., concurring).
187. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
188. "If a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,' it is
fair to characterize its behavior as predatory." Id. at 605. Although elated that "Aspen is in many
ways an advance in the application of economic analysis to antitrust law," Judge Easterbrook did
not claim a total Chicago victory. He faulted the Court for putting the burden on the defendant to
show that its conduct is efficient and for asking the question-" 'is it efficient?'-without offering
some criteria." Easterbrook, On Identiying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 972,
977-78 (1986). The debate continues: Wiley, "After Chicago". An Exaggerated Demise?, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 1003; Hovenkamp, Chicago And Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014.
189. See Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust
Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353 (1978).
190. These changes are "access" obstacles:
With increasing frequency, plaintiffs have failed to achieve full adjudication of complaints.
It is becoming substantially more difficult to prove conspiracies, and courts have been ex-
hibiting greater receptivity to summary motions. Standing continues to bar many com-
plaints. Other disputes are being kept from the courts by arbitration agreements, which
enjoy a new found respectability. Even antitrust law's commerce requirement, once con-
sidered a largely meaningless restriction on jurisdiction, is being rejuvenated. And, with a
few notable exceptions, many plaintiffs are being barred by the Noerr-Pennington and
state-action exemptions.
Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power And Access (Part I), 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 275, 332-33
(1987) (citations omitted).
191. Wermiel, Bork Confirmation to Bench Could Give Rulings on Antitrust a Free-Market Slant,
Wall St. J., July 3, 1987, at 32, col. 5; Wermiel, High Court Nominee Has Left Conservative Trail On
Economy Despite Few Footprints Elsewhere, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1987, at 68, col. I.
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Kennedy is a lawyer-judge without antitrust experience. Commentators suggest
that the new Justice is not a "doctrinaire follower of the school of legal thought
known as 'law and economics' ,192 and that he "doesn't try to fit every case into
a grand scheme." 193
Kennedy's antitrust opinions are succinct and address the issue. Unlike
Bork, he does not sprinkle his opinions with ideological gratuities nor does he
use footnotes for preaching. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's decisions are
clearly within the mainstream of Chicago School doctrine. For example, his
vertical distributorship decisions track GTE Sylvania's efficiency rationale: "Ju-
dicial deference to the manufacturer's business judgment is grounded in large
part on the assumption that the manufacturer's interest in minimum distribution
costs will benefit the consumer." 194 He is inclined to favor a rule of reason
analysis, intimated by his short concurring opinion to Judge Sneed's rejection of
per se in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.195
Kennedy is cautious and will not have the impact of a persuasive ideologue
like Bork.196 As someone on the periphery of the Chicago movement, it is un-
likely that he would be a factor in espousing the revolution in Court conferences.
He is, however, a Reagan conservative with a probusiness and free market per-
spective. Kennedy is a sure bet to join the antitrust conservatives.1 97
C. The Obsolescence Factor
Despite aggressive support from liberal-populists and a resilient tradition,
antitrust, and particularly Clayton 7, are destined to become what Richard Hof-
stadter once called a "faded passion."198 A progeny of smokestack "heavy"
industry and a manufacturing system that followed a predictable growth pat-
tern, antitrust doctrine faces obsolescence from external changes.
Globalization of markets and international competition, rejected by anti-
trust traditionalists, is a fact of life for all firms, including those in the small to
medium range.199 As a result, conventional assumptions involving domestic
market concentration and the consequences of "market power" are questiona-
ble, if not irrelevant to the world market. More importantly, in a global capital-
192. Wermiel & Hume, Judge Kennedy's Conservative Rulings on Business Often Debated by
High Court, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 56, col. 1.
193. Dewyer, Business Can't Bank on Judge Kennedy's Vote, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1987, at 33.
194. A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).
195. 643 F.2d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
196. "He has a much greater respect for precedent [than Bork] .... Gallagher, Here Comes
The Judge, NAT'L REV., Dec. 18, 1987, at 33.
197. "Judge Kennedy's opinions, like those of retired Justice Lewis Powell whom he would re-
place, portray a conservative who doesn't believe in applying antitrust laws too stringently or to
business situations for which he believes they weren't intended." Wermiel & Hume, supra note 192,
at 56, col. 1-2.
198. R. HOFSTADTER, WHAT HAPPENED To THE ANTITRUST MOVEMENT 188 (1967).
199. "So suddenly that it almost defies belief, the U.S. has seized the lead in the race for global
competitiveness. Many of its industries have become the world's low-cost producers." Nasar,
America's Competitive Revival, FORTUNE, Jan. 4, 1988, at 44. A global market also exists for merg-
ers and acquisitions. Rosen, The Explosion in International Merger and Acquisitions, A.B.A. J., May
1985, at 70.
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ist market antitrust is an American provincialism, a legacy of a frontier
smokestack mentality. Post-World War II efforts to colonize Japan and Europe
with antitrust have failed.2°° Extraterritorial jurisdiction is, at best, an impotent
gesture and, at worst, a challenge for retaliation. 201 Within this environment,
antitrust and Clayton 7 are alien and an added cost to American firms. Profes-
sor Thurow summarizes: "In markets where international trade exists or could
exist, national antitrust laws no longer make sense. If they do anything, they
only serve to hinder U.S. competitors who must live by a code that their foreign
competitors can ignore."'202 Another major critical factor signalling the demise
of antitrust is that segments of the global economy in the developed countries
are "postindustrial. ' '20 3 Postindustrial industries are composed of service and
technology-oriented firms. They compete in creating and then reducing the life
span of technology. Information, not steel, is the "strategic resource." 2°4 The
"creative destruction" time span of high tech products is so ephemeral that mar-
ket power could not survive the length of an antitrust suit. Sophisticated cus-
tomers in the postindustrial economy "will be more aware of the competitive
alternatives... and more able, and willing, to shift to such alternatives should
their existing supplier increase his prices or fail to keep up in improving his
products. '20 5
Exponential leap-frogging in new technology inhibits fact-finding within the
adversarial process.20 6 The government's unsuccessful monopolization suit
against IBM confirms the inability of the "faded passion" to deal with modern
technology. The "unarticulated premise underlying the IBM dismissal.., is the
sense that antitrust is not the proper vehicle to use in order to resolve the huge,
highly complex and often intractable issues raised in these cases." '207
200. "Under United States leadership the victorious allied powers moved to break up Japanese
and German industrial and financial combines and impose antitrust laws on the American model to
prevent the re-emergence of international cartels." Martin, The Evolution of Industrial Policies: A
World Perspective, in ISSUES AFTER A CENTURY OF FEDERAL COMPETITION POLICY 115, 121
(1987).
201. The British have a "claw-back" statute which allows British firms to recover two-thirds of
any treble damage award. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 257 (1981).
202. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 146 (1980).
203. See D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973); J. NAISBIrr, MEGA-
TRENDS (1982); A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970). For a more specialized view, see T. FOR-
ESTER, HIGH-TECH SOCIETY: THE STORY OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION
(1987).
204. J. NAISBrrr, supra note 203, at 15; see D. BRANDIN & M. HARRISON, THE TECHNOLOGY
WAR: A CASE FOR COMPETITIVENESS (1987); F. MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBU-
TION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); Information Power, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 14,
1985, at 108.
205. Pretrial Brief For Defendant at 230, United States v. I.B.M., 69 Civ. 200-Div. (No. 72-344)
(D.N.E.).
206. See Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power And The Need for Institutional
Reform, 94 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1981). The inability of jurors to comprehend complex antitrust
litigation has been documented. A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYS-
TEM (1984).
207. Goodale, AT&T and IBM: Do US. Actions Compute? N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1982, at 4, col. 3;
see F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN & J. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS AND UNITED STATES V. IBM (1983).
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Like the demise of the law of bailments, antitrust doctrine is succumbing to
new business relationships. Technology creates organizational configurations
that do not fit the accepted merger characterizations and do not generate tradi-
tional types of "market power." For example, the trend for domestic firms is to
create "dynamic networks." These firms are "vertically disaggregated'; relying
on other companies for manufacturing and many crucial business functions. ' 20 8
The corporation is being "reinvented" into a network of subsidiries.209 These
firms are dedicated to the efficiency ideal, and as a result, the competition is in
creating products that perform at higher efficiency levels. This form of behavior
is hardly a target for Clayton 7 or other antitrust provisions.
In seeking to collect public, governmental, and judicial support for an an-
timerger reaction, the counterrevolutionaries are competing with states that
have been enacting antitakeover laws. State action is a sharp contrast with the
conglomerate era, when Clayton 7 was the primary weapon against merger ac-
tivity. State antitakeover laws make it more difficult and costly for hostile raid-
ers to complete acquisitions. "The political motivation behind state antitakeover
laws is obvious-us vs. them." 210 They reflect a state's interest in preventing
loss of industry, curbing unemployment, and checkmating other cultural and
social dislocations. 21 ' A political reaction by state legislatures deflates the an-
timerger rhetoric by counterrevolutionaries. Constituencies, such as entrenched
management, union, and local interests, who would otherwise demand antitrust
reaction, are now placated by state action.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE CHICAGO REVOLUTION WINS
After sifting through cases, enforcement performance, and rhetoric, one
must conclude that Chicago is very close to accomplishing de facto repeal of
Clayton 7, if not antitrust. Getting political control of the government and the
enforcement system is obviously of critical importance to a counterrevolution.
Control would supply a forum and enforcement leverage, but would not assure
success. The counterrevolution must still confront the "new" Supreme Court,
overcome the pervasive legacy of Chicago, and counter dynamic changes in the
new market environment.
208. Special Report, And Now, the Post-Industrial Corporation, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 3, 1986, at 64.
209. Naisbitt and Aburdene project the emergence of "small work groups where communication
is quicker and more effective, and where the increasing number of baby boomers are experiencing the
'small is beautiful' entrepreneurial environment that is consistent with their values ...... J. NaIS-
Brrr & P. ABURDENE, RE-INVENTING THE CORPORATION 37 (1986).
210. Bartlett, Beware Of State Takeover Laws, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 179. Under the lead-
ership of T. Boone Pickens, raiders "are pressing Congress for legislation that would preempt the
state laws and thereby avoid what they warn would be the 'balkanization' of the securities markets
through the proliferation of state antitakeover statutes." Victor, Taking On Takeovers, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 9, 1988, at 79.
211. Ironically, while takeover laws contribute to the demise of Clayton 7 enforcement, they are
inconsistent with Chicago economics. "States have a very different view of major corporations than
free market economists. All the economist see are the raider, management, and shareholders. The
states see customers, vendors, employees, and taxes; the unions see jobs." Bartlett, supra note 210, at
182. For Chicago's criticism of management's resistance to takeover, see Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981).
1988]
962 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
Whether antitrust "fades" or not, it will never be the same. In the practical
world of law professor and practitioner, the choices are evident-switch to new
fields or rely on the populist-liberal counterrevolution for revival. The latter
leads to the tarpits.
